# 1NR

## DA

### Extend their Ryan causes Romney wins evidence. Impact is inevitable. Also, no link. Evidence is about wind PTC not the aff.

### Calculation answered on case

## CP

### Extend the permutation as a test of competition. No offense here. Their claims of calculations are answered on the case

### Theory

#### Counter-interpretation negative gets state CPs.

#### lit base checks – we have to have a solvency advocate – garuntees the aff ground

#### increases aff ground – every new actor is something new they can impact turn. Logically limited by solvency advocates so they can predict every actor.

#### most real world – actors cooperate with each other on specific actions, the alternative over simplifies policy making and kills real world education.

#### Err neg on theory, reject the arg not the team

## Framework

#### Subjectivity subverts the anti-capitalist struggle – it is only from the objective material facts of class that the exploitation of labor can be explained and undermined

Zavarzadeh 3 (Mas’ud, “The Pedagogy of Totality” p.23-25, in “JAC: A Journal of Rhetoric, Culture, and Politics”, Volume 23.1, http://www.jaconlinejournal.com/archives/vol23.1.html)

Objectivity is not writing (epistemology); it is the very structure of reality, which is another way of saying it is ontological. Bourgeois pedagogy, in an ideological maneuver concealed as a philosophical questioning of positivism, reduces the ontological to the epistemological and then deconstructs the epistemological as an effect of textual displacement and, in doing so, denies the existence of an objective reality. Idealist pedagogy, which is a theoretical arm of the ruling class, has always opposed the objective and objectivity in order to elevate the theological and the speculative and thus foster illusion in the mind of students - future workers. Positivism, which has ruthlessly opposed the theological and the metaphysical since the height of capitalist pedagogical theory in the nineteenth century, has been the target of unrelenting attacks by bourgeois radical pedagogy. The most recent assaults against positivism are mounted by post-al writings (poststructuralism, postmarxism, postcolonialism, postmodemism), which disperse the objective in the play of errant tropes (Derrida), in hegemonic consensus (Laclau and Mouffe), and in cultural affect (Hall). As my arguments for privileging the conceptual, the non-observable structures of the "working day" (exploitation), the critique-aI, and anti-instrumental teaching (that is, against teaching as "skills" training) demonstrate, the pedagogy of totality is antipositivist. Even though positivism has fought theological and metaphysical speculations, which are always spaces in which class interests lurk, it is, as a philosophical movement, subjectivist and antimaterialist (see Lenin, Materialism). The antimaterialism of positivism is now recirculated, with an antipositivist rhetoric, in the neopositivist theories of post-aI pedagogies from poststructualism (Derrida's corpo- real textualism) and neo-Gramscian postmarxism (Lac1au and Mouffe's empiricist hegemonism) to articulatory cultural theory (Hall's actualist analyses). The pedagogy of totality demonstrates the anti-critique-al instrumentalism of these neopositivist pedagogies by foregroundingtheir teaching strategies which erase the why of critique-al teaching and substitute for it the how oftechne. Derrida, Laclau and Mouffe, and Hall are exemplary of the new pedagogues who, following positivist tendencies, deny concept, abstractions, and laws of motion and instead found their practices on the sense-able (that is, the sensuous and the observable), on rhetorical instantism and, above all, on semiotic physics to assert the singular and, as in all positivism, cancel the universal. Objectivity is produced by human practice, the basis of which is labor-material production. To be more clear, objectivity is the outcome of "social metabolism, "the dialectical relation of labor and nature (Marx, Capital 1, 198). By "dialectical," I do not mean "two-way," "hybrid" and! or "multifaceted"-as Euroamerican marxists do. Rather, I use the concept as "the study of contradiction in the very essence of objects" (Lenin, "Conspectus" 251-52). Contradictions, class struggles, the law of value, and social and economic crisis, which form the foundation of all contemporary social practices, are not epistemological. Rather, they are the fundamental structure of reality under wage labor. In other words, as humans produce their material1ife through their labor, they produce the objective (world). In producing their material1ife, to be precise, humans "enter into definite relations that are indispensable and independent of their will" (Marx, Capital 21). The subject of transformative pedagogy is the structure of these objective relations (that underlie knowledges), which are produced by humans but are independent from their consciousness, since "it is not the consciousness of men that determines their being, but, on the contrary, their social being that determines their consciousness"(22).The pedagogy of totality is both objective and emancipatory it is emancipatory because it is objective: "[K]nowledge which cannot be regarded as objective is powerless or useless.... The practices relying on such pseudo-knowledge are adventurist and even harmful. Failing to meet the requirement of objectivity, they are bound to become arbitrary" (Naletov 139). The eradication of the objective is always and ultimately an economic act: it is part ofthe class struggles ofour time over the surplus labor ofthe global proletariat. By obscuring the objective, for instance, triumphalist neoliberalism has effectively marginalized (objective) labor, which is the source o f social wealth (and thus o f science) and instead has valorized the (subjective) consciousness as producer ofwealth (knowledge), as in the concept of "knowledge capitalism." The fact that the "subjective" is itself an accumulation of many objectivities - it is produced in the production of material life-is concealed by the theological theories of the autonomy of consciousness popularized by such writers as Jacques Lacan, Emmanuel Levinas, and the recirculation of Bergsonian theosophy in the religious writings of Deleuze, Guattari, and new feminist theosophers such as Elizabeth Grosz. The pedagogy of totality, through class critique, unpacks the theo-semiotics of consciousness-as-excess that now dominates radical bourgeois pedagogy. To focus on individual consciousness and language instead of the objective world is to mis-educate people by teaching them the textual strategies of deep fantasizing about themselves and their place in the world-as-is instead of the knowledge that enables them to act on the world. In the end, this lesson only naturalizes wage labor and the fantasizers' subservient position in it. As the objective economic reality of wage-labor produces wealth for the transnational bourgeoisie and brings misery and daily alienation to the rest ofpeople, students who are taught by the pedagogy of the affective that objectivity is a language fiction, learn to compensate for their abjection through retreating into deep cultural dreaming and consuming popular culture, which like the pedagogy of affect manufactures mass fantasies. To teach for human emancipation, pedagogy has to abandon the fetish of consciousness and language so that it can re-ground itself in the objective reality of human labor.

#### Cap K resolves the impact to your argument. Problems with rationality are not intrinsic to rationality themselves but rather to their manifestations. Cap K resolves the economic and material relationships that pervert materiality in the SQUO.

## Case

### 1NR – Onto Debate

#### They allow the worst to occur. The culminating impact of how we’re approaching the world is going to result in ecological catastrophe that results in existence. That’s Foster on the Cap K. Global warming, resource wars, etc are all results of modern capitalism. We have to resolve short term impacts before focusing on resolving our being. They permit the worst to occur. This is the only way to have long term ontological rethinking. That’s Santoni.

#### It’s also a logical requirement – before we can have questions of being, we have to “be” in the first place.

Nye, PhD Political Science from Harvard, ‘86

[Joseph, Served as Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs, 1986, “Nuclear Ethics” pg. 45-46]

Is there any end that could justify a nuclear war that threatens the survival of the species? Is not all-out nuclear war just as self contradictory in the real world as pacifism is accused of being? Some people argue that "we are required to undergo gross injustice that will break many souls sooner than ourselves be the authors of mass murder."73 Still others say that "when a person makes survival the highest value, he has declared that there is nothing he will not betray. But for a civilization to sacrifice itself makes no sense since there are not survivors to give meaning to the sacrifical [sic] act. In that case, survival may be worth betrayal." Is it possible to avoid the "moral calamity of a policy like unilateral disarmament that forces us to choose between being dead or red (while increasing the chances of both)"?74 How one judges the issue of ends can be affected by how one poses the questions. If one asks "what is worth a billion lives (or the survival of the species)," it is natural to resist contemplating a positive answer. But suppose one asks, "is it possible to imagine any threat to our civilization and values that would justify raising the threat to a billion lives from one in ten thousand to one in a thousand for a specific period?" Then there are several plausible answers, including a democratic way of life and cherished freedoms that give meaning to life beyond mere survival. When we pursue several values simultaneously, we face the fact that they often conflict and that we face difficult tradeoffs. If we make one value absolute in priority, we are likely to get that value and little else. Survival is a necessary condition for the enjoyment of other values, but that does not make it sufficient. Logical priority does not make it an absolute value. Few people act as though survival were an absolute value in their personal lives, or they would never enter an automobile. We can give survival of the species a very high priority without giving it the paralyzing status of an absolute value. Some degree of risk is unavoidable if individuals or societies are to avoid paralysis and enhance the quality of life beyond mere survival. The degree of that risk is a justifiable topic of both prudential and moral reasoning.

#### They say root cause but – doesn’t matter. Our impacts happen on a shorter time frame mean that you have to solve extinction first before dealing with ont. Rethinking. Also, root cause is cap. That’s on the Cap page.

#### They say ethics but we control the root cause of the ethics debate. Their type of thinking was complicit in the Holocaust. The quest to find the purest form of being inevitably resulted in the erasure of an entire race. Independent reason to vote negative. That’s CPS 96.

#### Reflection justifies another holocaust – no guarantee of a good end.

Haas, Professor of Philosophy at Case Western Reserve University, ‘99

[Peter, Ethics after the Holocaust, p. 302-303]

Roth tries to address this dilemma. He notes, correctly in my view, that "the answer... will not be found in some clinching intellectual argument or irrefutable philosophical analysis." He then goes on to state, however, that the best responses "involve sustained reflection on the memories people should share, the decisions we should make about how to live after Auschwitz, and the questions that we ask about all of those aspects of our experience." This proposed solution raises two questions in my mind. The first is why reflection on such issues should make a difference at all. That is, it is not clear to me what the connection might be between reflection and avoiding another Holocaust. Perhaps there is a sort of Kantian anthropology at work here that assumes that our reflections will lead to "objectively" good intentions and that our actions in turn will conform to such good intentions. The mechanism of transferring good reflection into good intention, and then good intention into good action, however, needs to be spelled out. It is hardly self-evident in the postmodern world. The other question assumes that reflection can somehow be useful in shaping future policy. I cannot help but wonder what insures that future potential Nazis, upon reflection, will reach the conclusions we want them to. What if upon reflection they decide we should support racial warfare, that the memories people of their race should share are memories of victory and triumph, and so on. I wonder if one of the operative assumptions here is that the Holocaust occurred because its framers did not reflect enough, that they were ill-informed or uneducated. All the evidence that we have, however, suggests just the opposite. There were in fact many intellectuals, philosophers, and theologians among them, who did reflect on what was happening around them, who did understand what the Nazi persecution of the Jews and others was about, and who did nonetheless openly approve. So reflection itself is no guarantee that people will come to the "right" conclusion.

#### They have no answer to this in CX. No clue what rethinking leads to.

### 1NR Calculation

#### They say calculations are the root cause of violence, not true. The problem is not with calculative thought is not too much rationality, but too little.

Marsh 95 (James L., Professor of Philosophy at Fordham University, Critique, Action, and Liberation p. 227-228 GAL)

In contrast to Heidegger's basically negative account of modern rationality as a calculation rooted in *Gestell.* or "enframing." we note in Husserl a fundamental endorsement of the project of science. Enframing is the technological context in modern society in which all qualitative difference is minimized or suppressed or used for the sake of profit. Basically accepting the premise that it is good to be scientific, in the sense of being ordered to judgments in evidence, he finally urges the person so committed to be fully consistent with that premise. Full commitment to judgments grounded in evidence leads one. as we have already seen, to phenomenological reflection on the life-world as the *fons et origo* of objects, language, and presuppositions essential to the scientific enterprise. Scientism. and in a similar way logicism as he criticizes it in the *Formal and Transcendental Logic,* is insufficiently scientific because it refuses to move beyond positive science. Scientism is unscientific; logicism is illogical. Husserl enters into the pathology of western *Ratio* by criticizing it from within dialectically rather than rejecting it from without in a totalizing Heideggerian objectification. Dialectic rather than "rejectionism" is the strategy. The result of Husserl's dialectical criticism of modem philosophy and science is a more reflective, more critical, more comprehensive account of rationality that preserves the legitimate projects of science and transcendental philosophy, negates one-sided objectivism and subjectivism, and develops a new, higher viewpoint, that of transcendental phenomenology. This account contrasts with Heidegger's *Denken.* a questioning, receptive openness to being which moves beyond evidential, conceptual rationality altogether. For Husserl. the alternative to a less adequate scientistic. subjectivistic rationality can only be a more comprehensive, more critical, more reflective account of rationality.Finally, in contrast to Heidegger's account of the darkness of the modern rooted in *Gestell,* Husserl tries to show that scientism is rooted in a forgetfulness of the life-world that reifies scientific concepts and mistakes them for the things themselves. Such an account forgets the historical and logical genesis of scientific concepts from perceived things to imagining and drawing of shapes to geometry to abstract formal logic to various calculative techniques. In contrast to Heidegger, however. Husserl does not equate such abstract calculation with rationality as such or with scientific rationality. Rather in its forgetfulness of origins, in its reification. and in its oversimplification such calculation reveals itself as insufficiently rational. The problem with calculation as one degenerate form of modernist reason is not too much but too little rationality. Calculation as forgetfulness of the life-world is not the essence of rationality but the essence of irrationality which as such can be criticized with reason's resources and can be transcended rationally. Heidegger s recourse to *Denken* is. therefore, not only arbitrary, but redundant and unnecessary. *21*

#### Also, makes sure that tech doesn’t overcome us by reckoning with its costs. That’s Kocelmans.

#### Calculation is good, the only question is whether you use calculations to save the other, which we do. Their ethic only leads to cooptation.

Derrida, Professor of Philosophy, French and Comparative Literature at the University of California, Irvine, ‘2

[Jacques, Directeur d’Etudes at the Ecole des Hautes Etudes en Sciences Sociales in Paris, 2002, Acts of Religion, p. 255-57]

This excess of justice over law and calculation, this overflowing of the unpre­sentable over the determinable, cannot and should not [ne peut pas et ne doit pas] serve as an alibi for staying out of juridico-political battles, within an institution or a state, between institutions or states. Abandoned to itself, the incalculable and giv­ing [donatrice] idea of justice is always very close to the bad, even to the worst for it can always be reappropriated by the most perverse calculation. It is always possible, and this is part of the madness of which we were speaking. An absolute assurance against this risk can only saturate or suture the opening of the call to justice, a call that is always wounded. But incalculable justice commands calculation. And first of all, closest to what one associates with justice, namely, law, the juridical field that one cannot isolate within sure frontiers, but also in all the fields from which one cannot separate it, which intervene in it and are no longer simply fields: the ethical, the political, the economical, the psycho-sociological, the philosophical, the liter­ary, etc. Not only must one [il faut] calculate, negotiate the relation between the calculable and the incalculable, and negotiate without a rule that would not have to be reinvented there where we are “thrown’ there where we find ourselves; but one must [il faut] do so and take it as far as possible, beyond the place we find our­selves and beyond the already identifiable zones of morality, politics, or law, beyond the distinctions between national and international, public and private, and so on. The order of this il faut does not properly belong either to justice or to law. It only belongs to either realm by exceeding each one in the direction of the other—which means that, in their very heterogeneity, these two orders are undis­sociable: de facto and de jure [en fait et en droit]. Politicization, for example, is interminable even if it cannot and should not ever be total. To keep this from being a truism, or a triviality, one must recognize in it the following consequence: each advance in politicization obliges one to reconsider, and so to reinterpret the very foundations of law such as they had previously been calculated or delimited. This was true for example in the French Declaration of the Rights of Man, in the abolition of slavery, in all the emancipatory battles that remain and will have to remain in progress, everywhere in the world, for men and for women. Nothing seems to me less outdated than the classical emancipatory ideal. One cannot attempt to disqualify it today, whether crudely or with sophistication, without at least some thoughtlessness and without forming the worst complicities. It is true that it is also necessary to re-elaborate, without renouncing, the concept of eman­cipation, enfranchisement, or liberation while taking into account the strange structures we have been describing. But beyond these identified territories of juridico-politicization on the grand geo-political scale, beyond all self-serving misappropriations and hijackings, beyond all determined and particular reappropria­tions of international law, other areas must constantly open up that can at first resemble secondary or marginal areas. This marginality also signifies that a vio­lence, even a terrorism and other forms of hostage taking are at work. The exam­ples closest to us would be found in the area of laws [lois] on the teaching and practice of languages, the legitimization of canons, the military use of scientific research, abortion, euthanasia, problems of organ transplant, extra-uterine con­ception, bio-engineering, medical experimentation, the “social treatment” of AIDS, the macro- or micro-politics of drugs, homelessness, and so on, without forgetting; of course, the treatment of what one calls animal life, the immense question of so-called animality. On this last problem, the Benjamin text that I am coming to now shows that its author was not deaf or insensitive to it, even if his propositions on this subject remain quite obscure or traditional.

#### Calculative thought is necessary in order to secure justice in the face of specific forms of oppression that deny “being” or “alterity”.

Campbell, 99

[David, Prof of Int’l Politics @ Univ. of Newcastle, Moral Spaces, p. 50-51]

In pursuing Derrida on the question of the decision, a pursuit that ends up in the supplementing of Derridean deconstruction with Levinasian ethics, Critchley was concerned to ground political decisions in something other than the "madness" of a decision, and worried that there could be a "refusal of politics in Derrida's work" because the emphasis upon undecidability as the condition of responsibility contained an implicit rejection of politics as "the field of antagonism, decision, dissension, and struggle," the "domain of questioning s Yet from the above discussion, I would argue that Derrida's account of the procedure of the decision also contains within it an account of the duty, obligation, and responsibility of the decision within deconstruction. Moreover, the undecidable and infinite character of justice that fosters that duty is precisely what guarantees that the domain of politics bears the characteristics of contestation rightly prized by Critchley. Were everything to be within the purview of the decidable, and devoid of the undecidable, then (as Derrida constantly reminds us) there would be no ethics, politics, or responsibility, only a program, technology, and its irresponsible application. Of course, for many (though Critchley is clearly not among them), the certainties of the program are synonymous with the desires of politics. But if we seek to encourage recognition of the radical interdependence of being that flows from our responsibility to the other, then the provocations give rise to a different figuration of politics, one in which its purpose is the struggle for-or on behalf of-alterity, and not a struggle to efface, erase, or eradicate alterity. Such a principle -one that is ethically transcendent if not classically universal-is a powerful starting point for rethinking, for example, the question of responsibility vis-avis "ethnic" and "nationalist" conflicts.'°6 But the concern about politics in Derrida articulated by Critchley is not about politics per se, nor about the possibilities of political analysis, but about the prospects for a progressive, radical politics, one that will demand-and thus do more than simply permit-the decision to resist domination, exploitation, oppression, and all other conditions that seek to contain or eliminate alterity. Yet, again, I would argue that the above discussion demonstrates that not only does Derridean deconstruction address the question of politics, especially when Levinasian ethics draws out its political qualities, it does so in an affirmative antitotalitarian manner that gives its politics a particular quality, which is what Critchley and others like him most want (and rightly so, in my view). We may still be dissatisfied with the prospect that Derrida's account cannot rule out forever perverse calculations and unjust laws. But to aspire to such a guarantee would be to wish for the demise of politics, for it would install a new technology, even if it was a technology that began life with the markings of progressivism and radicalism. Such dissatisfaction, then, is not with a Derridean politics, but with the necessities of politics per se, necessities that can be contested and negotiated, but not escaped or transcended.

### 1NR – Yar

#### This is a DA to their methodology. Focus on ontology is self-justifying and inevitably circular. Political actionthen is impossible and materiality is shoved aside. They have no chance of political change and freedom. That’s Yar.

#### Focus on ontology fails – questions are irresolvable.

Arnd-Caddigan and Puzzuto, ‘6

[Margaret (Assistant Prof. Soc. – East Carolina U) and Richard (Associate Prof. Soc. – ECU), Qualitative Social Work, “Truth in Our Time”, 5:4, Sage]

From the authors’ perspective, the problem is not which ontology a researcher embraces. Rather, problems arise based on two practices; the first of these is the call for orthodoxy. Such homogeneity is neither necessary nor even desirable. Ontological and epistemological questions are not empirical questions. They are neither subject to resolution via empirical analysis nor is it necessary that there be a single answer to the question, though continued reflection and discussion is desirable. This difference or ‘otherness’ in ontological and epistemological perspectives is not a deficit. Bakhtin (1986) and Levinas (1996) have emphasized that it is through the ‘other’ that the self becomes knowable. This ‘self ’ can be either individual or culture. For our purposes we are envisioning ‘research cultures’ populated by adherents of various perspectives. Bakhtin (1986: 7) stated, ‘it is only in the eyes of another culture that foreign culture reveals itself fully and profoundly’. The contact between cultures and resulting dialogue raises new questions, reveals new aspects, and new depths of meaning. Further, Bakhtin (1986: 7) stated that ‘such a dialogic encounter of two cultures does not result in merging or mixing. Each retains its own unity and open totality, but they are mutually enriched’. From this perspective the elimination of the other lessens the possibility of the self. Each of the perspectives is enhanced by the others. For the profession of social work, there is a stated mission. For practice within the USA, it is elaborated as such: The primary mission of the social work profession is to enhance human wellbeing and help meet the basic human needs of all people, with particular attention to the needs and empowerment of people who are vulnerable, oppressed, and living in poverty. (National Association of Social Workers [NASW], 1996: para. 1) This mission is approached by the application of knowledge, skill and technique in practice. The context of the practice will change over time as can be seen by even the most cursory glance at social work history. The type of knowledge necessary to address the mission has changed and is likely to change again in the future. As Bookchin (1990) has pointed out, it is diversity that enables successful adaptation in times of transformation. The broad seeking of singular answers including the seeking of a singular research method may not, and from the authors’ perspective is not, in the interest of social work. The second problem with rigid stances concerning ontology is the practice of critiquing others’ research from a position that is ultimately, even if covertly, ontologically different. If ontologies are ultimately beliefs, rejecting a method or technique from a different ontology solely due to its difference is analogous to declaring that a Jewish person is not religious because he or she does not observe Christmas, or declaring a Christian non-religious because he or she does not observe Yom Kippur. Judaism and Christianity are closely related belief systems but dialogue across the division of beliefs has proven quite difficult. The self-understanding of a research approach is guided by its ontology. In turn, the research act, as seen by the researcher, is quite different depending on the assumed philosophical perspective. The resolution of the qualitative–quantitative debate may have been achieved by acknowledging only some forms of qualitative research and designating other forms as ‘not research’. This appears to be tactic employed by evidence-based practice advocates.Perhaps the way that the critical realist-constructionist debate is being handled is parallel: a blanket rejection of some kinds of research as ‘not methodologically rigorous’ or ‘not research’. Blanket dismissal of alternate perspectives is not a new event. It can be found in Hudson’s (1982/1995) and Brekke’s (1986/1995) challenge to Heineman [Pieper] (1981), and Rosen’s (1994) critique of Kondrat (1992). Hudson decried the abandonment of research when Heineman Pieper suggested that research could arise from a post positivist perspective. Brekke labeled nonpositivist research as being equal to a ‘hallucination’. Rosen viewed Kondrat’s suggestion of a non-technical rational approach as a challenge to ‘scientifically based knowledge’ and ‘extra-scientific’. In each case, for the logical positivists ‘science’ is the ‘discovery’ of the regularities and qualities of an independently existent world. As Heineman Pieper so eloquently argued, that is not the only possible self identity of a researcher. Similarly, if one assumes the ‘truth’ of critical realism, that person will reject contructionist/hermeneutic based research as well as logical-positivist research for not adopting the methods and techniques that are consistent with the former ontology. Heineman-Pieper et al. (2002: 22) stated that people who adopt a social constructionist ontology ‘undermine . . . the scientific quality and value of social work research’. Their argument against research from a different ontological position thus parallels exactly the dismissal Heineman [Peiper]’s (1981) work received from logical positivists. Our plea is for the acceptance of difference. Accepting different ontological stances means that we must also accept as ‘legitimate research’ designs, techniques or methods that are consistent with the ontology and epistemology of the researcher. The research may be of varying quality. This can be addressed from within the perspective. The utility of the research can be addressed from a broader perspective. We have suggested two divides, qualitative–quantitative and belief in or rejection of a mind-independent reality. These divides provide four quadrants. To borrow from Nietzsche (1998), none of these quadrants have a ‘God’s eye’ perspective.

### 1NR – Phenomenology

#### Phenomenology ultimately fails. This is a DA to their methodology and a reason to prefer the criticism. Couple of reasons

#### We have no idea and no way of understanding “transcendental values” and the ways we incorporate them. Bartok states that empirical questions will always come first in the way we interact with the environment because we cannot understand the UNEXPLAINABLE. This is why a material focus is good.

#### Ontology cannot factually come first. We understand material questions and how that colors the way we be. Marx 1 impacts this on the Cap flow.

#### We have different ways we intend actions. No unified resistance nor reflection. We will inevitably have different motivations in seeking our being and how to understand it. That’s Searle.

### 1NR – Solvency

#### They say focus on tech – doesn’t matter. Still link to phenomenology bad arguments. Focus on rethinking doomed to fail. CA from above.

#### They say authentic attunement to nature. No clue what that means. Yar answers this above. They lead to never ending critique. These questions are irresolvable. That’s Puzzoto.

#### Group pol education and pedagogical argument. Their methodology for engaging the political is flawed and NEVER leads to action. That’s Yar. We cannot resolve the issue. This kills education because they never resolve of any of their impacts Phenomenology answers this.